September 29, 2023


Throughout a convention final week, Ryan Danks, Director of Civil Enforcement on the US Division of Justice’s Antitrust Division (DOJ), recommended that merging events—not the antitrust enforcement companies—ought to devise fixes for allegedly anticompetitive transactions.

Danks said “that one thing is damaged about the way in which that the antitrust group talks about cures within the context of mergers, the place events will usher in a three-to-two or four-to-three or perhaps a two-to-one [transactions] and say ‘now we would like you, authorities, to work with us to determine learn how to repair this’ . . . that’s not our job. Our job is to keep up competitors.”

Danks added that merging events bear the accountability for remedying their anticompetitive transactions and have extra data on the companies, permitting them to formulate robust options. Such “fix-it-first” approaches might permit merging events to finish their transactions faster, avoiding prolonged merger opinions and consent decree negotiations.

Danks additionally recommended that “the only treatment . . . is to only cease an anticompetitive transaction from occurring,” strongly hinting that at present’s DOJ would moderately problem a whole transaction than work with the events on devising a treatment to handle particular aggressive considerations in restricted product or geographic markets.

Jonathan Kanter, Assistant Lawyer Basic for the Antitrust Division, conveyed comparable views in two speeches final week, making it clear that merger enforcement on the DOJ will turn into much more vigorous.

On September 13, 2022, Kanter:

  • Warned that “[c]ompanies contemplating mergers that will hurt competitors ought to know that the Antitrust Division is not going to again down from a struggle as long as that risk stays.”
  • Emphasised that the Clayton Act’s “expansive definition of antitrust legal responsibility” requires the federal government solely to show {that a} transaction’s impact “could also be considerably to minimize competitors.” In response to Kanter, antitrust companies have, for too lengthy, “underenforced a statute that was meant to be prophylactic” by specializing in concrete proof of a merger’s impact on costs.

On September 16, 2022, Kanter mentioned that antitrust enforcers “can now not be so cautious to keep away from overenforcement that [they] deliberately underneathimplement the regulation.”

Shifting away from negotiating settlements that permit transactions to proceed whereas resolving anticompetitive points is a part of a development of dramatic coverage and procedural adjustments at each the DOJ and Federal Commerce Fee (FTC) designed to discourage mergers and acquisitions (M&A), reminiscent of:

  • Suspending early termination of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act (HSR) ready interval for transactions that don’t increase aggressive points
  • Sending merging events “shut at your individual danger” letters, informing the events that antitrust investigations are ongoing regardless of expiration of the HSR ready interval
  • Insisting on inclusion of prior approval/prior discover provisions in all merger settlements
  • Together with new subjects, such because the affect on labor and surroundings, in Second Requests and including further hurdles to modifying Second Requests.


Merging events ought to more and more contemplate resolving doubtless aggressive points with their transaction earlier than the antitrust enforcement companies increase considerations. To take action, events and counsel must carry out an intensive evaluation of the aggressive impacts of their deal. As a part of this, they need to contemplate worst lifelike case situation planning to know the areas during which the DOJ, FTC and state Attorneys Basic are more likely to conclude that the transaction is anticompetitive after they conduct their investigation, together with reviewing firm paperwork and interviewing prospects and rivals. A “fix-it-first” resolution doubtless might want to resolve all problematic points. Such “fix-it-first” approaches could be approached by:

  • Structuring the transaction to exclude a sale of the problematic property
  • Eliminating any problematic overlaps (g., by divesting sure competing property earlier than making an HSR submitting)
  • Submitting an HSR on the unique transaction after which providing to withdraw filings and re-file the transaction after coming into into personal agreements, exterior of a consent order course of, thus resolving the company’s considerations.

These approaches supply each potential advantages and downsides to merging events.

By resolving doubtless aggressive points exterior the consent order course of earlier than the HSR submitting, merging events can doubtlessly keep away from any important DOJ or FTC overview and velocity their path to closing. Nonetheless, if the structural repair is just not ample to get rid of company considerations, the events could also be pressured to handle these considerations with additional steps. Acquisition agreements ought to depart ample time to permit for these numerous steps, together with discovering a purchaser for the problematic property.

Whether or not really fixing-it-first or resolving antitrust company considerations exterior of a proper consent course of, the merging events can doubtlessly keep away from the implementation of onerous consent decree provisions (reminiscent of these requiring the merging events to offer important help past typical market phrases to divestiture patrons) or provisions that restrict the events’ freedom of motion associated to future transactions (reminiscent of requiring company prior discover and/or prior approval). Additional, dealing with these points exterior the formal consent decree course of can happen a lot faster whereas additionally avoiding public remark and/or judicial overview, that are a part of the consent order course of.

Nonetheless, there is no such thing as a assure that the antitrust enforcement companies will discover an executed or proposed repair ample to resolve aggressive considerations. Merging events should spend a number of months negotiating a repair with a 3rd get together, just for the DOJ or the FTC to search out the proposed divestiture inadequate or the divestiture purchaser unqualified to interchange competitors. Additional, merging events might lose substantial timing leverage with the antitrust companies by resolving aggressive points exterior the consent decree course of. The antitrust companies usually have between 30 to 120 days after the events’ compliance with a Second Request (relying on whether or not a timing settlement was entered into) to resolve whether or not to problem the transaction. If merging events try to resolve doubtless aggressive points exterior the consent decree course of, the antitrust companies are usually not topic to any comparable timing strain.

In all, the historic use of the consent settlement course of was a tried-and-true means to resolving potential issues with mergers in a constructive method between companies and the federal government. The suggestion from the DOJ to resolve these considerations exterior of that follow is one other step by antitrust enforcers so as to add uncertainty and danger for events searching for to merge whereas understanding {that a} repair is required to realize clearance. The message from the DOJ is to repair it first your self—and repair it sufficiently—or danger being taken to courtroom.